Defence minister Krishna Menon was in the Soviet communist camp and Finance minister Morarji Desai and YB Chawan in the American capitalists camp. General Thimayya and several generals and bureaucrats were much tilted in favour of the Americans.
Nehru's team was built around his friendship with certain individuals rather than on merit. Individual egos orbiting a vain and egoistic Nehru inhibited the formulation and implementation of a common philosophy and strategy, within his team. Everyone in his team hated and opposed everyone else. It seems that everyone in Nehru's team did pretty much what they wanted.
The military leadership too was thoroughly compromised, such as the appointment of
Gen. Pran Nath Thapar, (Karan Thapar's father) as the army chief simply on paper. He exercised no real power or influence.
It was Lt. Gen. Brij Mohan Kaul., a by-product of flamboyance and nepotism, who due to his proximity of being a relative of Nehru, and repeatedly promoted out of turn, who called the shots. As Corps Commander, Kaul not only vacated his post during the war, but also reported sick and parked himself at his residence in Delhi, from where he incompetently directed the war.
Gen. Kaul, "met the US under Secretary of State Chester Bowles the summer of 1962 without the knowledge of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister and discussed with him the possibility of a Chinese attack that fall. The question is, why did Kaul, a serving army officer meet Bowles? If Kaul knew about the imminence of the attack, then why did he proceed on holiday?
Another villain in the piece was BN Mullik (Head of Intelligence). He incompetently or deliberately fed Nehru false information and met with CIA staff and carried out their bidding.
Nehru based on the advice of these men, adopted the 'Forward Policy', which was the provocative building of many Indians army outposts further north of the McMahon Line in disputed territory claimed by China and even behind Chinese border posts with a view to preventing supplies to the Chinese and forcing their withdrawal from disputed territory. Mullik repeatedly assured Nehru, Menon and others that China would not react, and Kaul assured Nehru that he would throw them out even if they reacted. This action was in retaliation to China's unilateral action of building a road across Aksai Chin.
The Chinese claimed that 120,000 sq. kms of land in India's control actually belonged to China. What China really wanted most was access between their two main western provinces - Xinjiang and Tibet. China proposed a settlement, it was willing to take an uninhabited but strategically important Aksai Chin from India and give up its claim on NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). Nehru refused to even discuss the matter. This became a major point of contention.
Mullik thought it best to show an aggressive stand. When permission was denied to deploy , troops along the non militarised and quiet border, as it might be unnecessarily provocative, Mullik exceed his brief. He borrowed from the Inspector General of police of Jammu & Kashmir, and posted in the Ladakh area, a company of armed CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force). This gave rise to Chinese fears of India's aggressive intentions and duplicity.
It is difficult to imagine that Nehru was unaware of what was happening. The CIA with help from Mullik, helped supply arms, gave training, and support to the 40,000 strong Tibetan National Volunteer Defence Army (NVDA), led by the Dalai Lama's brothers Gyalo Thondup and Thubten Jigme Norbu. The CIA gave the Tibetan fighters outdated weapons, insufficient supplies and ammunition, no radio or communications equipment, trained them in jungle guerrilla warfare which was unsuitable for Tibetan terrain etc.
In view of Nehru's disinterest in saving Tibet, The American objective shifted from not saving Tibet to triggering the destruction of the Tibetan freedom movement and anger China at India's expense. Chinese reports mention that 87,000 Tibetans being eliminated during the March 1959 Lhasa uprising. As a consequence, His Holiness the Dalai Lama fled to and sought refuge in India.
All these actions convinced a livid China that India was playing a double game. China decided that negotiations with India were leading nowhere. India had to be taught a lesson once and for all. They thought rather than partner with, it was better to subordinate India to China.
